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Abstract 
 
The objective of this study is to compare the effect of different types of public direct support 
for R&D projects on firms’ technological capabilities. We distinguish between low-interest 
loans and national and European subsidies. Using data on 4,407 Spanish firms during the pe-
riod 2002-2005, we estimate a multivariate probit to analyse the determinants of firms’ partic-
ipation in public R&D programmes and, later, the impact of this participation on firms’ R&D 
activities using two different procedures. Regardless of the methodology employed for the 
analysis, the results suggest that being awarded any type of direct aid clearly increases the 
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strument, the greatest effect corresponds to the case of European grants, where the impact is 
more than three times larger than the one of loans. As for R&D intensity, the hypothesis of 
full crowding-out of private R&D is rejected for all types of support. In addition, we find that 
the impacts of subsidies and loans reinforce each other when they are jointly awarded to 
SMEs. However, for large firms we cannot rule out the existence of crowding-out effect be-
tween subsidies and loans. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the tradition of the economic literature, public support of research, development and inno-
vation (R&D&I) activities is mainly justified by the existence of market failures (Hall, 2002; 
Hall and Lerner, 2010). The ‘public good’ nature of knowledge prevents full appropriation, 
which pushes private R&D&I investment below the socially optimal level. In addition, inno-
vating companies may suffer from a financing deficit due to the presence of information 
asymmetry and moral hazard. Private financers may be reluctant to lend when the investment 
is concentrated essentially on intangible assets. This situation results in a higher cost of fi-
nancing with respect to ordinary investment and a lower level of private external funding of 
R&D&I activities. These market failures would be greater for small firms and technology-
intensive start-ups (Hall, 2002). Through aid programs, public agencies implicitly certify 
these companies, reducing the information asymmetries and helping these firms to face finan-
cial difficulties. 
Public intervention could also have negative effects. Public support would displace private 
R&D spending if awarded firms reduce their own R&D investment beyond the level that 
would have been performed without the aid (Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). Innovation policy 
could be captured by permanent R&D performers, and politicians or interests groups may 
seek to allocate subsidies to benefit themselves (Lerner, 2002), selecting firms based on their 
likely success, regardless of a low marginal contribution of public aid.  
Taking this into account, there is a great deal of empirical evidence on the impact of public 
aid on private R&D (see David et al., 2000, Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014, and Becker, 2015, 
for a review). The variety of empirical methodologies used for this assessment is wide, in-
cluding specific techniques to control for potential endogeneity of public support, non-
linearities and firm heterogeneity (Wallsten, 2000; Busom, 2000; Lach, 2002; Duguet, 2004; 
González et al., 2005; González and Pazó, 2008; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; OECD, 2006; 
Clausen, 2008; Takalo et al., 2013). Many of these studies infer that direct support generates 
larger additionality at the extensive margin (share of R&D performers) than at the intensive 
margin (R&D intensity of actual performers). However, most papers consider only one pro-
gramme in their analyses and this fact makes it difficult to accurately compare the impacts 
among funding systems, which can differ in their objectives, the national or supranational 
character of the supporting entity and the funding scheme (Blanes and Busom, 2004). In this 
sense, it seems reasonable that their evaluation also provides different results.  
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Three exceptions are the papers by García and Mohnen (2010), Czarnitzki and Lopes- Bento 
(2014) and Liu and Rammer (2016). In all cases, the empirical analysis is based on microdata 
from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The first one compares the impact of public 
support from the central government and the European Union (EU) on the innovation of Aus-
trian firms, using the third wave of the CIS, which covers the years 1998-2000. To measure 
the effectiveness of these programmes, the authors propose a structural model of the endoge-
neity of innovation and of public support for it. The estimation of this model by the method of 
asymptotic least squares suggests that receiving central government support increases the in-
tensity of R&D by 2.3 percentage points and yields a 2.5 percentage point increase in the 
share of sales of new to firm products. However, EU support is never significant once national 
support is taken into account. 
The study by Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014) also offers a comparison of the impact of 
national and European funding on innovation intensity and performance. The empirical analy-
sis is based on the German part of the CIS for seven waves but, as the data can only be used 
as pooled cross-sections, to face the endogeneity problem, they apply a variant of a non-
parametric matching estimator. In terms of innovation input, their results provide evidence 
that getting funding from both sources displays the highest impact, while EU subsidies have 
higher effects when the firm receives funding from only one source. As for innovation per-
formance, funding from both sources again yields higher sales of market novelties and patent 
applications, but in this case the impact of national funding is superior when only one type of 
grant is obtained.     
Liu and Rammer (2016) analyse the effectiveness of regional, national and European funding 
programmes implemented in Germany on both product and process innovations and on export 
performance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Using also a panel dataset from 
the German part of the CIS from 2001 to 2014, they find that public financial support contrib-
utes to higher innovation outputs, which in turn translate into higher export success in later 
years. But this relation only holds for certain sources of public funding and certain types of 
innovation output.  
To contribute to this literature, in this paper we investigate the role of two specific dimensions 
of supporting schemes: the national or supranational character of the financing agency, which 
is usually associated with the national or international character of the R&D project, and the 
magnitude of reimbursement implied in design of the public support. In particular, to our 
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knowledge, no previous empirical research exists comparing the effects of public subsidies 
and loans on private R&D. With this objective, we analyse the effect of participation within 
three different public funding programmes on the technological performance of Spanish 
firms. Specifically, we consider public programmes based on low-interest loans versus na-
tional and European innovation subsidies and we distinguish between their effects on exten-
sive and intensive margins. We also contribute to the literature by studying the existence of 
possible differences in the treatment effects between small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and large firms. 
For this purpose, we integrate two data sets. The first one is provided by the Centre for the 
Development for Industrial Technology (CDTI). This public organism grants financial help of 
its own to companies and facilitates access to third-party funds for the execution of both na-
tional and international research and development projects. During the period 2002 to 2005, 
the CDTI awarded zero-interest loans that could reach 60% of the total budget of the R&D 
project, with a period of repayment of up to 10 years.  
The second database is provided by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) and corresponds 
to a sample of innovative firms from the Spanish Technological Innovation Survey (the Span-
ish version of the CIS). From this database we obtain the information about public subsidies 
for innovation activities from the different levels of government. Overall, we compile a ho-
mogeneous sample that consists of an unbalanced panel of 13,546 observations and 4,407 
firms for the period 2002 to 2005. Specifically, 2,185 of them have received some type of 
public support for their R&D projects during the period. 
The factors taken into account to apply for a low-interest loan from the CDTI or for a national 
or European subsidy can differ. However, some of them may be the same as those that affect 
the firm’s R&D decision. This fact can generate a bias in the impact of these funding instru-
ments on the innovative performance of firms if the CDTI or other public domestic and for-
eign organisms award firms with a better technological profile.  
To deal with this selection problem, in this paper we follow two different methodologies. 
Firstly, we use a Heckman’s treatment effect model. The first stage in this model consists of 
the estimation of a multivariate probit model to study the determinants of each of the three 
schemes of public support. In the second stage, we analyse how this participation affects the 
R&D intensity of the firms. Secondly, we complement the study by performing an economet-
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ric matching technique. This procedure allows us to test whether there is substitutability or 
complementarity among the different public funding policies.   
Our results confirm that, regardless of the methodology employed for the analysis, the three 
instruments are effective to stimulate the extensive margin. As for the intensive margin, the 
hypothesis of full crowding-out of private R&D is also rejected for all types of support. In 
addition, the impacts of subsidies and loans reinforce each other when they are jointly award-
ed to SMEs. However, for large firms we cannot reject the hypothesis of crowding-out effect 
between subsidies and CDTI loans. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we highlight how some characteris-
tics of support programmes can justify their different impact on firms’ R&D activities. In sec-
tion 3, we summarize the main features of innovation policy in Spain regarding financial sup-
port. In Section 4, we describe the empirical model and the data. Section 5 shows the esti-
mates and discusses the results. Finally, we present key conclusions in Section 6. 
2. THE LINK BETWEEN INNOVATION IMPACT AND PROGRAMME 
FEATURES  
Assessing the impact of public support of firms’ R&D projects on R&D&I activities requires 
a clear understanding of the design of public programmes. Although the general design of an 
R&D programme is likely to have an impact on innovation, it is difficult to clearly associate 
certain design features of R&D programmes with (not directly intended) innovation (Europe-
an Commission, 2009). 
Among innovation policy instruments, the type of public intervention more devoted to the 
reduction of the gap between the social and the private return of R&D investments is financial 
support, which can be direct, through subsidies or low-interest loans, or indirect, mainly 
through R&D tax credits.  
The three public programmes analysed in this paper are different types of direct financial sup-
port. In all cases, to obtain the aid the firm must submit an application that is rated by the 
agency mainly in terms of its R&D excellence. However, supporting schemes differ in two 
specific dimensions: the national versus supranational level of the programme and the reim-
bursable character of the aid. As for the first aspect, why should we expect a different impact 
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of R&D subsidies depending on the government level of the supporting organism? There are 
at least three reasons. 
First of all, the design of R&D programmes can differ between public agencies of different 
levels of governance, especially when they have specific objectives. Although the main justi-
fication for public intervention is the correction of market failures, the aims of public support 
can also consist of stimulating specific groups such as R&D champions (picking-the-winners 
strategy), SMEs with major financial constraints to undertake R&D projects, or companies in 
sectors with large knowledge externalities. In addition, in the case of national agencies, the 
objective could be the technological updating of firms in traditional or declining sectors (see 
Blanes and Busom, 2004), where by the agencies try to increase the probability of survival 
and avoid employment losses. And depending on the final objective, selected projects can be 
more or less market-oriented or focused on core technologies of participants. For instance, the 
Framework Programme (FP) of the European Union is characterised by the participation of 
universities and research institutes in consortia and the relevance of pre-competitive research, 
while the Eureka Programme is more market-oriented (Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002).  
Alternatively, as Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2007) point out, programmes implemented by 
different jurisdictions could be complementary if the agencies coordinate efficiently to take 
into account the nature and extent of spillovers and other relevant market failures. In fact, 
most supra-national policies are justified by the existence of cross-border spillovers and econ-
omies of scale. In this line, Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2007) test whether the Spanish gov-
ernment and the European Commission have different selection criteria for awarding R&D 
subsidies to firms. They conclude that the determinants of firm participation in each pro-
gramme are different, suggesting that these programmes do not systematically overlap ex-
post, as intended ex-ante by policy makers. 
A second argument is related to the different costs of application in each programme 
(Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2014). These application costs are mainly related to bureaucrat-
ic and administrative requirements that are enlarged when the procedure of granting implies a 
negotiation phase. Firms usually perceive this negotiation phase as resource-consuming, de-
laying the timing of the R&D project (Barajas and Huergo, 2010). 
In addition, application costs increase with coordination costs in the case of programmes that 
imply the existence of self-organised consortia, as often happens in supra-national R&D pro-
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grammes. The organisation of the network of partners, the formulation of the proposal and the 
daily monitoring of the project usually entail higher overhead costs in time and human re-
sources than in the case of individual R&D projects. 
And a third reason for having different impacts among programmes has to do with the size of 
expected knowledge spillovers. These spillovers refer both to the company's ability to capture 
information flows from the public pool of knowledge (incoming spillovers) and to the ability 
to control information flows out of the firm (outgoing spillovers) to appropriate the returns 
from innovation.  
The measurement of these spillovers is especially complex in cooperative R&D agreements. 
In fact, as Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) find out, there is a significant relation between 
external information flows and the decision to cooperate in R&D, and the level of knowledge 
inflows and outflows is not exogenous to the firm. This element is especially important for 
our analysis, as projects financed through supra-national programmes usually correspond to 
Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) that involve partners from different countries. In this case, the 
technological capabilities of subsidised firms can be affected not only by public aid but also 
by spillovers of cooperation among partners. However, most papers that study the impact of 
public programmes that support RJVs consider R&D collaboration and R&D public support 
to be an integrated treatment (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002; Bayona-Sáez and García-
Marco, 2010; Kaiser and Kuhn, 2012; Barajas et al., 2016). An exception is the paper by 
Czarnitzki et al. (2007), who interpret RJVs and subsidies as heterogeneous treatments for a 
sample of German and Finnish firms. Although they find that the combination of both treat-
ments has a positive impact on the firm’s R&D expenditures or the number of patents, when 
cooperation and public support are separately analysed, subsidies for individual research do 
not significantly affect R&D or patenting by German firms. 
The reimbursable character of public support is a second dimension that could affect our 
analysis when comparing the effect of subsidies and loans. Firms tend to have fewer incen-
tives to apply for loans than for grants in case of high-risky projects, as they would have prob-
lems to pay the principal back in the case of failure. However, as perceived by programme 
managers, the existence of private co-funding is highly relevant for innovation impact (Euro-
pean Commission, 2009). In addition, although preferential (below market) or low-interest 
loans in fact imply a hidden subsidy in terms of interest savings, they are fully compatible 
with fiscal incentives, while subsidies in many cases imply that firms cannot benefit from tax 
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cuts that are related to R&D investments. Furthermore, the percentage of the firm’s budget 
that is allocated to the project is higher than usual, and the signalling effect of the agency 
awarding in terms of quality certification of the project is stronger, making it easier to obtain 
private financing outside the company (Huergo and Trenado, 2010). Subsidized loans also 
self-enforce more discipline on the recipients, as the monitoring of the project development 
by the agency is also higher. For these last reasons, low-interest loans should be expected to 
generate higher efficiency than the equivalent subsidy in terms of the generation of product or 
process innovations. 
3. INNOVATION POLICY IN SPAIN 
In general, the design of innovation policy tends to balance the fulfilment of the objectives of 
public administrations and the costs of political action. As a consequence, there is a great var-
iability of public instruments among countries. Regarding R&D financial support, countries 
differ in the use and the intensity of the aid. In general tax credits are mostly used to encour-
age short-term applied research, while direct subsidies are more targeted to foster long-term 
research (David et al., 2000; OECD, 2010). 
In Spain, around 20% of business R&D expenditures (BERD) are funded with public support, 
mainly through direct aid (17-18% of the BERD in 2007-2009, Heijs, 2011). In particular, the 
data from the Panel of Technological Innovation (PITEC) shows that around 30% of Spanish 
innovative companies had access to public subsidies to finance their R&D expenditures dur-
ing the 2000s.1 These subsidies came principally from Spanish administrations, although a 
non-negligible percentage of innovative firms had also access to funds of the European Union 
(EU).  
As for national support, between years 2002 and 2005, two national plans of R&D were im-
plemented: the Fourth Plan (2000-2003) and the Fifth Plan (2004-2005). In both Plans a key 
objective was that Spanish firms generated products and services with a greater technological 
component that reinforced their competitiveness. The actions of the Plans were developed by 
mapping agencies managers to priority areas. There was an ex-ante evaluation for the selec-
                                                
1 The Spanish National Institute of Statistics constructs this database on the basis of the annual Spanish respons-
es to the Community Innovation Survey. The survey is targeted to manufacturing and services companies whose 
main economic activity corresponds to sections C, D, and E of NACE 93, except non-industrial companies be-
cause of the imprecision of methodological marking in the international context by other branches of activity.  
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tion of the proposals which was performed in two phases, one external and one internal. In the 
case of technological innovation projects, most of the direct R&D support was channelled 
through the CDTI, and the CDTI’s main instrument to support R&D projects consisted of 
credits at a preferential interest rate (below the market rate). 
Specifically, during the period 2002 to 2005 this agency financed three types of projects de-
veloped by firms: Technological Development Projects (TDP), Technological Innovation Pro-
jects (TIP) and Joint Industrial Research Projects (JIRP). The allocation of a proposal to one 
of these types was determined by the character of the R&D that is embodied in each project. 
Both the TDP and the TIP have an applied character and are developed by firms, with or 
without the collaboration of technological centres. The difference between them is that the 
former implies the creation or the significant improvement of a process, good, or service, and 
the latter consists of the incorporation and the active adaptation of rising technologies within 
the firm or new markets. In the case of JIRP, the main objective is to finance initiatives of 
pre-competitive research presented by industrial firms in collaboration with universities, pub-
lic research organizations, and/or Spanish centres of innovation and technology.  
For the three types of projects, the CDTI provided financing with a zero interest rate and a 
period of repayment of up to 10 years, regardless of the firm activity sector and size. The 
quantity of the loan could reach 60% of the total budget. The CDTI only backed projects that 
were technically and economically viable, but did not demand real guarantees from the pro-
moting company for the awarding of its loans. For the selection of projects, the CDTI speci-
fied the following general criteria: (a) Degree of fulfilment of the information required; (b) 
Scientific-technical quality of the proposal and degree of innovation; (c) The firm’s technical 
and financial capability to undertake the project; (d) The firm’s ability to exploit the results; 
(e) Potential market of the developments to be achieved; and (f) Fulfilment of encouraging 
effect. Note that these criteria are compatible with any of the potential goals discussed in the 
previous section (correcting market failures, fostering national champions or helping firms to 
upgrade), although they seem to be more focused on stimulating R&D excellence. Once R&D 
projects were approved, the CDTI monitored their development, verifying that these met the 
technological objectives and that the budget was properly executed, before disbursing all the 
funds granted. 
Although we have pointed out some differences between TDP, TIP and JIRP, the common 
features are more remarkable from the point of view of the financial conditions and projects’ 
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evaluation, so the three programs are jointly considered as a unique type of funding in the 
following sections.  
Regarding supra-national support, during the same period, Spanish firms got financing mainly 
through the 6th Framework Programme (FP) of the EU (2002-2006). In general, the FP sup-
ported complex- and large-scale projects – science oriented and selected by criteria of excel-
lence. Therefore, participants needed to have a certain level of technical and organisational 
capabilities. In addition, to encourage inter-European cooperation, firms and/or institutions 
from several countries must participate in order to be supported.  
As for the tax credits system, Spanish R&D fiscal treatment has a mixed design that combines 
the deduction by volume and by increase, and that is applicable to most of the costs generated 
by R&D investments, including wages, raw materials, R&D hired externally and assets amor-
tization.2 However, it is the tax authority that recognizes such expenses as eligible costs. The 
proportion of deductible R&D expenditure has increased over time, going from 10% in the 
early 1980s to 50% over the past years. Firms with R&D subsidies can also claim tax credits 
on the R&D expenditure remaining after subtracting 65% of the subsidies received. 
Unfortunately, we cannot consider indirect public support in our analysis because we do not 
have access to information related to R&D tax credits in our database. This can limit the re-
sults of our analysis as, nowadays, the Spanish tax system is considered one of the most gen-
erous among OECD countries in terms of the tax subsidy rate (OECD, 2012).3 
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND THE DATA 
Following the literature on impact assessment of R&D policies, the implicit question to an-
swer is what the behaviour of a supported firm would have been if it had not received this 
public aid. The problem is that each firm can only be observed either in the status of receiving 
the support or not. Therefore, to measure the effect of public aid on technological capability, 
we have to take into account that participation within a funding programme agency probably 
                                                
2 See more information on the design, scope and approval of R&D tax incentive relief for OECD countries and 
selected economies in OECD (2015). See also Arestei et al. (2015) for a comparative study of the effects of 
public support on business R&D across five European countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. 
3A nice exercise associating the use of R&D subsidies and tax incentives by Spanish firms with financing con-
straints can be found in Busom et al. (2014). They conclude that direct funding and tax credits are not perfect 
substitutes in terms of their ability to reach firms experiencing barriers associated to market failures. 
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depends on the same firm characteristics that determine innovative performance. That is, it is 
necessary to take into account both selection and endogeneity problems.  
Econometric literature has developed several methods in order to solve these difficulties 
(Heckman, 1979; Aerts et al., 2006; Guo and Fraser, 2010; Cerulli and Potì, 2012). In this 
paper, we employ two of the most used methodologies: a Heckman’s treatment effect model 
and an econometric matching procedure.  
As for the first method, initially a selection equation for the participation status is estimated 
for each of the three programmes considered in our analysis: the CDTI programme of low-
interest loans, the Spanish programme of R&D subsidies and the Framework Programme of 
the European Commission.4 Specifically, our first equation is devoted to the participation of 
firm i ( 1 ) i N  in public funding programme m ( 1, 2,3)m  during year t ( 1 ) t T and is 
formalised in terms of a multivariate model given by:  
*1  if  0
0  otherwise
    
mit mit m mit
mit
y x u
y  [1] 
where *mity  is a latent dependent variable, xmit is the set of explanatory variables that can differ 
across equations, m is the vector of coefficients and mitu  are the error terms distributed as 
multivariate normal, each with a mean of zero, and variance–covariance matrix V, where V 
has a value of 1 on the leading diagonal and correlations ρjk = ρkj as off-diagonal elements: 
1 12 13
2 12 23
3 13 23
0 1
0 , 1
0 1
 
 
 
                               
it
it M
it
u
u N
u
 
In the second step, we analyse the impact of this participation on the R&D intensity of the 
firms. Following the approach of Griffith et al. (2006), we believe that, to some extent, all 
firms make some innovative effort. However, below a certain threshold, the firm is not capa-
ble of picking up explicit information about this effort and will not report on it. Thus, we es-
timate a selection model for the observed R&D intensity. In particular, we think that we can 
measure R&D effort *itid  by the intensity of R&D expenditure itid  only if the firm makes and 
                                                
4 We have information only about financed projects and therefore we cannot distinguish between the firm’s deci-
sion to apply for the aid and the agency selection among the proposals. The main disadvantage of this lack of 
information is that the selectivity problem is not fully considered.  
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reports that expenditure. To represent this decision to perform and report R&D expenditures, 
we assume the following selection equation:  
3*
1 1 1 1
1
1 if   ´ 0 
0 otherwise
  

     
it mit m it it
mit
r p z
r ,  [2] 
where itr  is a binary variable that takes the value 1 when the firm invests in (and reports) 
R&D, and 0 otherwise. If the latent variable *itr  is bigger than a constant threshold (which can 
be zero), we then observe that the firm engages in (and reports) R&D activities. In this equa-
tion, mitp denotes the predicted value for the probability of participating within a public fund-
ing programme, m  is the parameter that reflects the impact of the different public aid pro-
grammes, 1itz  is a vector of observable explanatory variables, and 1 it  is an idiosyncratic error. 
Conditional on the performance (and reporting) of R&D activities, we can observe the quanti-
ty of resources allocated to this purpose; that is, 
3*
2 2 2 2
1
´ if 1
0 if 0
  

      
it mit m it it it
mit
it
id p z r
id
r
,  [3] 
where 2itz  is a vector of determinants of the innovative effort, which can differ from those 
determinants that explain the decision to perform and report R&D expenditures, and 2 it  is 
the error term.  
Therefore, we estimate a Heckman model, assuming that the error terms 1 i  and 2 i  follow a 
bivariate normal distribution with a mean equal to 0, variances 21 1   and 22 , and correla-
tion coefficient 12 . This structure allows us to analyse whether the impact of public aid dif-
fers across programmes, not only in the decision to undertake innovation activities but also in 
R&D intensity. However, due to restrictions in data availability, we cannot define measures of 
R&D intensity net of the received public aid. Therefore, through the estimation of equation 
[3] we can only test the hypothesis of full crowding-out, that is, total substitution between 
private and public R&D expenditures. We cannot test the so-called ‘additionality’ hypothesis, 
that is, we cannot measure the effect induced in company-financed R&D expenditures per 
euro of public support. 
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Notice that, in equations [2] and [3], to deal with the selection (and endogeneity) problem, the 
predicted probability of participation in each public programme is considered instead of the 
observed participation status. The economic rationale for this strategy is that we believe that 
the latent variable in equation [1] can be interpreted as the agency’s expectation about the 
returns of the project or, at least, about its adjustment to the targets of the public programme. 
In this sense, the prediction of the observed participation status would be a suitable instru-
mental variable for the unobservable latent variable. In this way, we not only take care that 
the participation is possibly endogenous, but we also qualify the relevance of the project for 
the public agency.5 
One disadvantage of this methodology is that it relies on very parametric assumptions, as it 
implies both linearity and errors' joint normality. In addition, given that the predicted proba-
bilities of participation are generated from the same set of explanatory variables, their joint 
inclusion in equations [2] and [3] would imply a problem of multicollinearity, preventing the 
analysis of the effect of multiple treatments. 
Therefore, we complement this analysis performing a matching procedure that does not re-
quire any functional form or a distributional assumption on the errors of equations [2] and [3]. 
However, we need to assume that all firm characteristics explaining the selection into a public 
funding program are observed (that is, the conditional independence assumption has to hold). 
Specifically, we follow the methodology by Gerfin and Lechner (2002), which is based on 
nearest neighbor matching and which has been used by Czarnitzki et al. (2007) and Czarnitzki 
and Lopes-Bento (2014) to consider multiple treatments in other innovation-related contexts. 
In our case, initially we defined eight mutually exclusive states of public funding: no public 
funding, only CDTI loan, only national subsidy, only EU subsidy, CDTI loan and national 
subsidy (but not EU subsidy), CDTI loan and UE subsidy (but not national subsidy), national 
and European subsidies (but not CDTI loan), and all types of public funding. This leads to 56 
possible combinations of treatments (see Table A.1 of Appendix.2). However, the effects of 
some of them could not be estimated due to data limitation (see Section 4.1 for more details 
on our data). Specifically, this problem appeared when one of the treatments involved in the 
combination was ‘CDTI loan and European subsidy’ or ‘All types’.  
                                                
5 Other studies that use this type of pseudo-instrumental variables approach in similar frameworks are Griffith et 
al. (2006), Huergo and Moreno (2011), and Barajas et al. (2012, 2016). 
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For this reason, in this part of our analysis we decided to focus on CDTI loans as policy tool, 
studying national and European subsidies as potentially complementary schemes. In particu-
lar, to facilitate the discussion, we distinguish among the cases of public funding shown in 
Table 1. Note that the treatment denoted as ‘only subsidies’ refers to firms that have been 
awarded a national subsidy and/or a European grant, but not a CDTI loan. In the same line, 
the treatment with the label of ‘CDTI loans & subsidies’ stands for firms that meet any of the 
following situations: having a CDTI loan and a national subsidy, obtaining a CDTI loan and a 
European subsidy, or being financed through the three programmes.  
 
Table 1: Cases of matching 
   Number of observations 
Case Actual status Counterfactual Total 
Treated 
group 
Control 
group 
A Only CDTI loan No public funding 1112 571 541 
B Only national subsidy No public funding 1376 707 669 
C Only European subsidy No public funding 280 143 137 
D Only subsidies No public funding 1715 868 847 
E CDTI loans & subsidies No public funding 728 375 353 
F Only national subsidy Only CDTI loan 678 337 341 
G Only European subsidy Only CDTI loan 187 95 92 
H Only subsidies Only CDTI loan 749 336 413 
I CDTI loans & subsidies Only CDTI loan 516 267 249 
J Only European subsidy Only national subsidy 242 123 119 
K CDTI loans & subsidies Only subsidies 634 321 313 
Note: Observations for total, treated and control samples are obtained after applying the matching procedure (see 
Appendix 3).  
 
 
As is well-known, the problem in this kind of analysis is that, for each firm receiving a specif-
ic treatment (actual status), we can only observe the actual R&D intensity. Therefore, we need 
to create the counterfactual, that is, we need to construct a control sample of firms with char-
acteristics similar to those of the treated group. Following the methodology by Gerfin and 
Lechner (2002), these nearest neighbors are selected based on propensity scores of receiving a 
certain treatment. The specification used to compute this propensity score is based on all ex-
planatory variables included in the multivariate probit depicted for the estimation of equation 
[1]. For each treated firm, we search for a firm in the counterfactual group that had the same 
probability of receiving the treatment but did not actually get it. The average treatment effect 
is estimated by the mean difference in the variable of the matched pairs.  
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For example, the case A allows us to analyse how R&D intensity of firms that only obtained a 
CDTI loan would vary if they have not been funded at all. We also test whether the different 
types of public funding have the same impact when they are separately awarded (cases A, B 
and C), and we compare to the joint effects of participating in different policy schemes as 
opposed to single scheme use (cases F to K). 
The detailed explanations about the matching procedure and the tests that we use to assess the 
performance of the propensity score matching can be found in Appendix 3.    
4.1. The database 
As we mentioned in the introduction, two data sources are used in this paper. The first one is 
the CDTI database of low-interest loans for R&D projects for the period 2002-2005. Specifi-
cally, we analyse 1,787 projects which were granted a low-interest loan by the CDTI during 
this period. These data are especially suitable for our analysis as most of the direct R&D sup-
port from the Spanish central government is channelled through the CDTI, and the CDTI’s 
main instrument during this period consists of loans at a preferential interest rate. 
This information has been completed with a database that was provided by the National Insti-
tute of Statistics (INE) and corresponds to a sample of innovative firms from the Spanish 
Technological Innovation Survey. In this survey, we find complementary information about 
sources of public financial support for innovation activities from the different levels of gov-
ernment. These data from the INE were anonymized for some variables, so firms from the 
sample could not be identified. As a consequence, the magnitude of the subsidies and loans is 
unknown. Therefore, as we have already mentioned, we cannot define measures of R&D in-
tensity net of the received public aid, and only total substitution between private and public 
R&D expenditures can be tested.  
For the estimations we have eliminated 48 observations with a ratio of R&D expenditures 
over sales bigger than 10 (more than 1000%); these relate mainly to new firms which have 
initiated their technological activities but have not yet begun to sell their products or services. 
The final sample consists of an unbalanced panel with 4,407 firms (13,546 observations). 
As can be seen in Table 2, around 50% of the firms do not obtain any type of public funding 
in the period, while less than 3% of firms are supported through the three schemes. In these 
sense, notice that our sample is slightly biased towards innovative firms, which have a higher 
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propensity to apply for public funding.  In particular, more than 45% of the firms are support-
ed by national programmes (CDTI loans and national subsides). However, the percentage of 
companies with European public funding is less than 10%. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of the sample by type of public funding. 2002-2005 
 Yearly observations Firms (in period 2002-2005)
No public funding 9,662 (70.1%) 2,222  (50.4%) 
Only CDTI loan 1,108  (8.2%) 635  (14.4%) 
Only national subsidy 1,451 (10.7%) 483  (11.0%) 
Only European subsidy 322  (2.4%) 160  (3.6%) 
CDTI loan & national subsidy 587  (4.3%) 624  (14.2%) 
CDTI loan & European subsidy 32  (0.2%)   25  (0.6%) 
National & European subsidies 324  (2.4%) 144  (3.3%) 
All types of public funding 60  (0.4%) 114  (2.6%) 
 13,546 4,407 
Notes: In column 1, firms are classified according to the year that they are supported or not. In column 2, firms 
are classified considering the whole period. 
 
 
The selection of explanatory variables in the model is based on previous empirical literature 
and is also determined by the availability of information in our databases. As for firms’ partic-
ipation in public R&D programmes (equation [1]), most papers include measures of the firm’s 
technological profile, as the chance to apply increases when the propensity to perform R&D 
projects is higher.6 The available information allows us to consider several variables. The first 
one is internal R&D intensity, which we compute as the ratio of internal R&D expenditures 
over total employment. We also define total R&D intensity as total (internal plus external) 
R&D expenditures per employee. In our sample, the means of these variables are greater in 
firms that have been awarded a European subsidy than in firms with a national subsidy, and 
superior in these nationally-subsidized firms than in firms with a CDTI loan (see Table 3).7 
                                                
6 See, for instance, Blanes and Busom (2004), González et al. (2005), Heijs (2005), Clausen (2008) or Huergo et 
al (2016). 
7 In Appendix 1, we present the definitions of the variables, and in Table A.2 of Appendix 2 we show their main 
descriptives for the whole sample.  
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Table 3: Means of main variables by type of public funding   
 
 
All firms 
Non-supported 
firms 
(1) 
Supported firms  Difference of means testa) 
CDTI  
loan (2) 
National 
subsidy (3) 
European 
subsidy (4) (1) vs (2) (1) vs (3) (1) vs (4) 
Technological characteristics         
- Internal R&D intensity (K€ per employee) (in logs.) 6.7   3.2 12.8 16.6 25.9 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Internal R&D performer (0/1) 0.592 0.450 0.879 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Patent application (0/1) 0.170 0.129 0.284 0.304 0.292 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Percentage of R&D employees (%) 43.1 32.0 66.4 73.4 79.4 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- R&D performer (internal or external) (0/1) 0.625 0.492 0.901 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Technological cooperation (0/1) 0.340 0.245 0.495 0.650 0.690 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Total R&D intensity (K€ per employee) (in logs.) 8.2 4.3 15.2 19.8 28.9 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- High and medium-tech manufacturing (0/1) 0.235 0.193 0.412 0.330 0.249 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- High and medium-tech services (0/1) 0.096 0.073 0.103 0.175 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other firm characteristics         
- Belonging to a group (0/1) 0.399 0.392 0.467 0.429 0.436 0.000 0.000 0.017 
- Exporter (0/1) 0.548 0.511 0.714 0.656 0.569 0.000 0.000 0.002 
- Foreign capital (0/1)  0.115 0.122 0.113 0.095 0.091 0.281 0.000 0.013 
- Public firm (0/1) 0.020 0.019 0.008 0.024 0.045 0.001 0.162 0.000 
- Relative labour productivity 1.000 0.998 1.028 0.989 1.065 0.475 0.888 0.254 
- Size (Number of employees)  358.2 375.0 268.0 329.9 587.3 0.000 0.053 0.000 
- Start-up (0/1) 0.032 0.021 0.060 0.055 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.049 
Number of observations  13,546  9,662 1,764 2,422 738    
Notes: The symbol (0/1) means dummy variable. a): p-value of a two-sample difference of means test. This test is a t-test for continuous variables and a two-sample z-test of 
proportions in case of dummy variables. 
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In addition, we introduce an indicator reflecting whether the firm has technological coopera-
tive agreements. We can distinguish between the kinds of partners, which can be clients, pro-
viders, competitors, consultants and laboratories, other firms of the group, universities, public 
research centres (PRCs) and technological centres. As can be seen in Table 3, the sample 
mean of these indicators is higher for participants in public R&D programmes than for non-
awarded firms. We also consider the prior application for patents that can reflect the firm’s 
technological and commercial success in the past. Again, the sample mean of this variable is 
higher for participants in national and European R&D programmes than in non-supported 
firms.  
Regarding the sectorial dimension, we define industry dummies at NACE 2-digit level to take 
into account the possibility of differing technological opportunities across sectors. As can be 
seen in Table A.3 of Appendix 2, regardless of the type of public aid, supported firms are 
relatively more present in high and medium-tech sectors. In addition to the variables that re-
flect technological features, we also consider in our specification other firms’ characteristics 
that can affect their participation in public R&D programmes. In this sense, the firm’s size is a 
usual determinant in most papers which deal with the impact of public funding. However, its 
effect on participation is not clear. SMEs are usually more affected by innovation-related 
market failures, so their benefits from public aid could be higher. However, large firms usual-
ly have more resources with which to undertake R&D projects and apply for the aid. In addi-
tion, public agencies can be too risk-averse to finance R&D of small firms.  
Statistics in Table 3 show that firms awarded by the CDTI and firms supported by national 
subsidies are smaller than non-supported companies. However, firms supported by European 
subsidies are bigger than non-participants in public systems. Most observations of the sample 
refer to firms which have between 10 and 50 employees (33.8%) and large firms, with more 
than 200 workers (33.9%). 
A second dimension frequently considered in the literature is the age of the firm. Again, its 
expected effect on participation is ambiguous. More experienced firms (older firms) are more 
likely to use public aid. However, young firms tend to be more financially constrained and, as 
a consequence, they could apply for and receive public aid more frequently. The information 
in our databases allows us to know whether the firm was born during the last three years. If 
this is the case, we consider the firm to be a start-up. Table 3 shows that the percentage of 
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start-ups is higher among firms supported by national and international agencies, especially 
by the CDTI.  
Another aspect that should be taken into account is the firm’s competitive position in the ref-
erence market, which could be captured by its market share, the evolution of sales or the ex-
porting activity. The key question here is what to expect. Will firms with more market power 
participate more in public programmes? Regarding international competition, the expected 
answer for exporters would be affirmative, for at least two reasons. Their position in interna-
tional markets could be a signal of their ability to transform innovations into successful prod-
ucts (Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006). Also, they could be facing lower application costs as they 
are more experienced in dealing with bureaucracy compared to non-exporters (Takalo et al., 
2013). In our sample, the presence of firms with foreign activity is higher among supported 
firms, especially by the CDTI (see Table 3).  
Finally, additional control variables are introduced. Time dummy variables are included, al-
lowing for business cycle effects or changes in national and European agencies’ budgets. As 
an indicator of the ease of access to external capital markets, possibly meaning better 
knowledge of the public aid system, a dummy variable representing the presence of foreign 
capital among shareholders is incorporated. As can be seen in Table 3, there are no significant 
differences between non-funded firms and participants supported by the soft loan system. For 
the same reason, an indicator of business group membership for each firm is considered. 
Agencies might be less willing to finance firms which belong to a group because it is ex-
pected that these firms benefit from the group in terms of having fewer financial restrictions. 
And a dummy variable that represents the presence of public capital is incorporated. Notice 
that a higher proportion of public firms are supported by the European agency. 
With respect to the decision to engage in R&D investment and the determinants of the intensi-
ty of the R&D (equations [2] and [3]), the theoretical literature suggests including variables 
related basically to technological environment, market conditions, financial constraints, ap-
propriability of technological returns and size (reflecting R&D economies of scale) as deter-
minants (see, for example, Arvanitis and Hollenstein, 1994; Klepper, 1996). 
To capture environmental and demand conditions, we have considered one indicator of the 
firm’s export character, the export intensity and time dummies. We expect that firms operat-
 20
ing in competitive international markets have more incentives to innovate and therefore to 
invest in R&D.  
As for financial restrictions, the high level of risk of R&D projects and the existence of in-
formation asymmetries between firms and suppliers of external finance increase the firms’ 
dependence on internal funds (Hall, 2002). Therefore, firms with liquidity constraints are ex-
pected to have more difficulties undertaking R&D projects. The evidence about the impact of 
financial restrictions on investment effort is mixed. Previous studies for the Spanish economy 
point out that, since 2000, the investment effort has been superior in firms that won public 
support than in those which applied for it without success, and greater in the latter than in 
firms that did not apply for it. Unfortunately, we do not have information about firms’ finan-
cial conditions in our database.8 However, given the aim of this paper, special attention is 
devoted to a firm’s participation in the CDTI low-interest loan programme and national and 
European innovation subsidies schemes. These public aid instruments could increase the 
chances of performing R&D, as tools that reduce a firm’s financial constraints.  
To indicate appropriability conditions, we use a measure of relative labour productivity and 
the proportion of R&D employees in the firm as a proxy of human capital. We think that 
those firms more productive and with more qualified personnel are more capable of 
assimilating new knowledge, whether it is developed internally or externally. Piva and 
Vivarelli (2009) provide evidence that supports this hypothesis for a panel of Italian firms. As 
expected, and as can be seen in Table 3, supported firms present a higher percentage of R&D 
employment than non-financed firms. Nevertheless, there is no difference in relative labour 
productivity between these two groups of companies.  
In addition, following previous papers for the Spanish economy, we introduce industry 
dummies that can also approximate sectorial technological opportunities and appropriability 
conditions (Beneito, 2003; Ortega-Argilés et al., 2005). Specifically, we included the 
dummies for firms that belong to high and medium-tech sectors. 
Along with the above variables, the specification includes indicators to capture differences in 
the firms’ investment behaviour in terms of the time of permanence in the market. In 
                                                
8 The Spanish Technological Innovation Survey includes information about the relative importance assigned by 
firms to the lack of funds in the firm or group, the lack of external financing or the existence of high innovation 
costs as factors that hamper innovation. However, this information was not provided in the selection of variables 
that the INE gave us to do this research. 
 21
particular, an indicator of newly born firms (start-ups) is included. Empirical evidence 
suggests that start-ups are usually among the most innovative firms; their survival probability 
as well as their growth rate depends strongly on their innovative behaviour (Audretsch, 1995; 
Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004). Finally, as in equation [1], we include as control variables 
some factors related to firms’ organisational aspects: belonging to a group, foreign capital, 
public capital and technological cooperation. 
5. RESULTS 
In this section, we present the results of our treatment effects analysis. We begin with the ex-
planation of participation in public aid programmes. Later, we analyse how participation in 
these programmes affects the R&D activities of the firms. 
5.1. The determinants of participation in public R&D programmes 
Table 4 shows the estimation of the determinants of firms’ participation in public aid pro-
grammes. Considering that we have information about three systems of public aid, we use a 
multivariate probit model (seemingly unrelated probit model).9 Some of the explanatory vari-
ables are included with one lag in the estimates to avoid direct simultaneity.  
As expected, the correlation coefficients ρ21and ρ32 are significantly different from zero and 
positive. In accordance with Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2007) and Czarnitzki and Lopes- 
Bento (2014), national support and European funding are positively linked to each other. The 
same happens with soft loans and national subsidies, indicating the presence of common un-
observed factors that affect the probability of participating in both programmes. A positive 
shock on the likelihood of being awarded an EU grant and a CDTI loan would also translate 
into a positive shock in the probability of getting a national subsidy. However, ρ31 is non-
significant, implying that there are no common unobserved factors affecting the probabilities 
of participating in the national soft loan system and the scheme of European subsidies. At this 
respect, in our very short panel most of non-supported firms in one year remain in the same 
status the following year, while awarded firms tend to change the specific type of public aid 
they achieve from one period to the next (see Table A.4 of Appendix 2). In this sense, transi-
tion rates across participation status do not suggest any clear pecking order in which firms 
make use of the different support channels.  
                                                
9 See Cappellari and Jenkins (2003). 
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Table 4: Participation in public R&D programmes. Multivariate Probit model 
 CDTI loan  
programme 
 National subsidy  
Programme 
 European subsidy  
programme 
 dy/dx S.E. dy/dx S.E. dy/dx S.E. 
Technological characteristics       
- Internal R&D intensity (in logs.)t-1 0.009 *** 0.001  0.024 *** 0.001  0.005 *** 0.001 
- Patent applicationt-1 0.017 *** 0.006  0.014 * 0.008  0.003  0.004 
- Technological cooperation with:               
 clientst-1  -0.001  0.009  0.026 ** 0.011  0.010 ** 0.004 
 competitorst-1  -0.027 ** 0.011  0.036 *** 0.012  0.016 *** 0.005 
 other firms from the groupt-1  -0.006  0.009  -0.014  0.012  0.009 * 0.005 
 providerst-1  0.002  0.008  -0.020 ** 0.010  -0.004  0.004 
 consultants & laboratoriest-1   0.002  0.009  -0.012  0.012  -0.001  0.005 
 universities, PRCs and technological centrest-1 0.010 * 0.006  0.101 *** 0.008  0.028 *** 0.004 
Other firm characteristics            
- Belonging to a group 0.015 ** 0.006  0.017 ** 0.008  0.003  0.004 
- Exportert-1 0.023 *** 0.006  0.006  0.008  0.008 ** 0.004 
- Foreign capital  -0.033 *** 0.008  -0.035 *** 0.011  -0.004  0.005 
- Public firm 0.024  0.024  0.065 ** 0.026  0.024 ** 0.010 
- Size (in logs.) 0.071 *** 0.010  0.026 *** 0.010  -0.002  0.004 
- Size squared  -0.006 *** 0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000 
- Start-up 0.064 *** 0.020  0.025  0.025  -0.022 * 0.011 
Wald test – Industry dummies 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ρ21 0.257***  (0.000) 
ρ31 0.001       (0.982)  
ρ32 0.297***  (0.000) 
Test [CDTI loan-National subsidy] 0.000 
Test [CDTI loan-European subsidy] 0.000 
Test [National subsidy-European subsidy] 0.000 
Log of likelihood function -6929.7 
Number of observations (number of firms) 8716 (3534) 
 
Notes: S.E.: Standard errors. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are computed at sample means. (t-1) denotes that the variable is includ-
ed with one lag. All regressions include a constant, time dummies for the years 2003 and 2004 and industry dummies at NACE 2-digit level. To avoid multicolinearity, the 
dummy variables corresponding to year 2002 and industry 1 (Agriculture) are excluded. Wald test reports the p-value of a test of joint significance of industry dummies. Test 
reports the p-value of a test of equality of coefficients. ρ21, ρ31 and  ρ32 (p-values in parentheses) are the correlation coefficients across equations 
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As for the explanatory variables, most of them are statistically significant and their marginal 
effects have the same sign in all columns. The Wald tests for industry dummies at NACE 2-
digit level show that all of them are jointly significant. However, the joint chi-square test 
clearly rejects the equality of coefficients across equations (p-value=0.000).  This result im-
plies that globally the participants within the three systems of public aid have different char-
acteristics, suggesting that the programmes do not completely overlap in terms of their recipi-
ents. 
The first fact that can be highlighted from Table 4 is the positive effect of having a higher 
technological profile on the probability of participation in all public aid programmes. The 
internal R&D intensity of the previous year has a statistically positive impact for all kinds of 
funding. Looking at the magnitude of marginal effects, the participation in national subsidy 
programmes reacts more sensitively to prior innovation experience than in the CDTI loan sys-
tem. 
Being a patent applicant in the previous year also positively affects the chance of participation 
in the soft loan and national subsidy systems. It seems that the CDTI is especially sensitive to 
the previous technological success of candidate firms in order to award a loan. These results 
are in accordance with the evidence provided by Huergo et al. (2016) for the same loan sys-
tem. They are also in accordance with Liu and Rammer (2016) who find that patent stock is 
highly significant and positive in explaining the probability of receiving public funding.  
In addition, having technological agreements in general increases the probability of obtaining 
European funding. This result is coherent with the objectives of the Framework Programme, 
which promotes cooperation between firms of different countries. The European agency is 
especially sensitive to cooperation with competitors and with universities, PRCs and other 
technological centres. A similar effect is obtained for participation in the national funding 
programme with the exception of the cooperation with providers. Our results are in accord-
ance with García and Mohnen (2010), who find that Austrian firms which cooperated in inno-
vation were more likely to get help from both national and EU sources during the period 
1998-2000. A similar result is obtained by Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014) for Belgian 
firms but only for small and medium firms which cooperate with foreign firms. However, 
technological cooperation does not seem to increase the propensity to participate in the soft 
loan programme. Only cooperation with universities, PRCs and other technological centres 
has a positive and significant impact, while cooperation with competitors shows a negative 
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effect. Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted with caution because of the high cor-
relation among the different types of collaboration partners in our survey data (see table A.5 
of Appendix 2). 
As for the rest of the firms’ characteristics, being an exporter in the previous year increases 
the probability of participating in the CDTI low-interest loan system and the European subsi-
dy system but does not affect participation in the national subsidy programme. The presence 
of foreign capital has a negative effect for obtaining national funding. This result suggests that 
the national government and the CDTI are more reluctant to finance firms that belong to for-
eign groups than to domestic ones. García and Mohnen (2010) and Czarnitzki and Lopes-
Bento (2014) also find a negative effect of this variable on European funding, but in our sam-
ple, we do not find this result. Group membership does not have a significant effect on Euro-
pean subsidies.  
Another interesting result in Table 4 is the existence of a non-linear effect of size on the prob-
ability of participating in the CDTI low-interest loan system. As firms are larger, they have a 
higher probability of being awarded by the CDTI, but the increase in size affects the probabil-
ity of obtaining financing marginally less. This result, which is in accordance with Huergo et 
al. (2016), suggests that applying for CDTI loans has some costs in terms of time and search-
ing for information, so larger firms have a higher probability of participating, although as a 
certain amount of resources is obtained, the size effect is smaller. 
Finally, being a start-up positively affects the chance of participation in the soft loan pro-
gramme. Although more experienced firms are more likely to know and use public aid pro-
grammes, younger firms are usually more financially constrained, having more incentives to 
apply for and receive them. It seems that the second effect exceeds the first one. In the case of 
national subsidies it is seems that both effects compensate each other, while the negative ef-
fect prevails for European public aid.   
In summary, participation within the CDTI loans system is specifically related to international 
market orientation and patents application. Due to the reimbursable character of this kind of 
public aid, it seems that technological results and performance success (measured by export 
activity) serve as collateral in order to be awarded. The participation in this public system is 
also non-linearly related to firm size. The probability of being awarded increases with the 
number of employees, but once firms are large enough, the marginal effect of size diminishes.  
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In the case of participants within the national subsidy system, the technological profile of the 
firms plays the key role, specifically regarding the R&D intensity. Participation is also associ-
ated with technological cooperation with competitors, clients and, especially, universities, 
PRCs and technological centres. In this case, the effect of size is strictly increasing.   
 
Finally, Spanish participation within European subsidy programmes also tends to be related to 
the presence in foreign markets and the existence of technological agreements. However, ap-
plying for patents and firm’ size seem to be irrelevant. In this respect, note that participation 
in this kind of programme usually implies the existence of self-organised consortia. In our 
analysis, we only have information about Spanish participants. However, firms with different 
characteristics can coexist in the same consortium if their resources and capabilities are com-
plementary. 
5.2. R&D equations 
Table 5 shows the results of the estimation associated with equations [2] and [3] explained in 
Section 3. In these equations, the predicted value for the probability of participating within a 
public funding programme is introduced in percentage. Therefore, we can interpret estimated 
marginal effect for each programme as the increase in the probability of performing R&D 
when the probability of participating within that programme increases in one percentage 
point.  
Specifically, we present the marginal effects of the Generalized Tobit model where the partic-
ipation and the intensity equations are estimated consistently by maximum likelihood. Most 
explanatory variables in the first equation are also considered as explanatory variables in the 
second equation. Due to the high correlation among the dummy variables that illustrate the 
different partners in technological agreements, in these estimates we consider a unique binary 
indicator of technological cooperation.   
In order to analyse whether the determinants of internal R&D expenditures differ from the 
determinants of total R&D expenditures, we present the results of the Heckman model for 
both internal and total R&D intensity. Notice that the correlation term rho is significant in 
both estimations, pointing out the necessity of estimating a selection model for the observed 
intensity.  
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Table 5: R&D intensity. Generalized Tobit model 
 Internal R&D  Total R&D  
 Propensity to engage 
in internal R&D (0/1) 
 Internal 
R&D intensity 
 Propensity to engage 
in R&D (0/1) 
Total 
R&D intensity 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
 dy/dx  S.E. dy/dx    S.E.   dy/dx  S.E. dy/dx    S.E. 
CDTI loan programmea) 0.013 *** 0.001 0.012 *** 0.002 0.013 *** 0.001 0.012 *** 0.002 
National subsidy programmea) 0.010 *** 0.001 0.026 *** 0.002 0.007 *** 0.001 0.027 *** 0.002 
European subsidy programmea) 0.006 *** 0.002 0.021 *** 0.003 0.006 ** 0.002 0.024 *** 0.003 
         
Technological characteristics         
- Percentage of R&D employeest-1 0.004 *** 0.000 0.004 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.000 0.004 *** 0.001 
- Technological cooperation t-1 0.083 *** 0.019 -0.268 *** 0.038 0.138 *** 0.018 -0.216 *** 0.046 
- High and medium-tech manufacturing    0.343 *** 0.030   0.396 *** 0.039 
- High and medium-tech services   0.156 ** 0.063   0.182 ** 0.065 
Other firm characteristics         
- Belonging to a group -0.015  0.017 0.146 *** 0.032 0.004  0.014 0.205 *** 0.039 
- Exporter t-1 0.114 *** 0.016 -0.089 ** 0.035 0.099 *** 0.014 -0.093 ** 0.043 
- Foreign capital  0.031  0.019 0.255 *** 0.060 0.018  0.016 0.332 *** 0.063 
- Public firm   -0.370 ** 0.153   -0.423 *** 0.160 
- Relative labour productivity t-1 -0.002  0.003 0.017 * 0.010 0.001  0.004 0.027 ** 0.013 
- Size (in logs.) -0.019 *** 0.004 -0.529 *** 0.011 -0.018 *** 0.004 -0.559 *** 0.056 
- Start-up   0.169 * 0.098   0.223 ** 0.106 
Selection term, rho   0.160 *** 0.031   0.080 *** 0.023 
Log of Likelihood Function -10,558.7 -11,617,1 
Number of observations (number of firms) 8,716 (3,534) 8,716 (3,534) 
Notes: a) The prediction of the probability of participating in each programme is obtained from Table 4. S.E.: Bootstrapped standard errors.  Coefficients significant at 1%***, 
5%**, 10%*. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are computed at sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to change from 0 to 1. All regressions include a 
constant and time dummies for the years 2003 and 2004. 
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Although it is possible to assume that most variables are exogenous, the indicators for being 
an exporter, technological cooperation, relative labour productivity and the percentage of 
R&D employees are again introduced with a lag in the decision equation to avoid direct sim-
ultaneity. The results in Table 5 for most control variables are in line with previous literature 
(Ortega-Argilés et al., 2005; Griffith et al., 2006; Hall et al., 2009; Huergo and Moreno, 
2011). Marginal effects have in general the expected sign in both equations.  
The estimations in columns (1) and (3) also show that being awarded any type of public sup-
port clearly increases the probability of conducting R&D activities. Participation in the three 
kinds of public funding systems raises the probability of self-financing internal R&D activi-
ties. The highest impact corresponds to soft loans. Specifically, an increase in one percentage 
point in the probability of being supported by the CDTI loan programme increases the proba-
bility of performing internal R&D in 1.3 percentage points. The impacts are quite similar 
when we consider total R&D expenditures. 
With respect to magnitude of R&D expenditures, as can be seen in columns (2) and (4), once 
the firm has decided to invest, again the three kinds of public aid stimulate the intensity of 
gross R&D investment, although the lowest impact corresponds to soft loans. European sub-
sidies have a slightly higher impact on total R&D intensity than on internal R&D intensity. 
Notice also that marginal effects of subsidies are quite similar regardless of the national or 
supranational character of the public agency. However, we cannot interpret the differences in 
the magnitudes of marginal effects as differences in the degree of ‘additionality’ among the 
three programmes, as we are not comparing the R&D intensity net of public aid of supported 
firms with that of non-supported firms.  
If instead of introducing the three variables denoting the participation in public programmes 
simultaneously in the equation, we consider a separate equation for the participation in each 
programme (see Table 6), estimated impacts are higher in both equations (decision to engage 
in R&D and intensity). This evidence points out that, when we do not take into account the 
correlation in the participation in the three programmes, the impacts of this participation could 
be biased. Note that this methodology does not allow us to properly measure the isolated ef-
fect of one single instrument of public support, as the three treatments considered in this stage 
are not mutually exclusive. are possible simultaneously 
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Table 6: R&D intensity (in logarithms). Generalized Tobit model 
 Dependent variable: 
 
Propensity to 
engage in internal 
R&D (0/1) 
Internal 
R&D intensity 
(log.) 
Propensity to 
engage in total 
R&D (0/1) 
Total R&D 
intensity 
(log.) 
CDTI loan programme a) 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.017*** 0.024*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
National subsidy programme a) 0.016*** 0.037*** 0.013*** 0.040*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
European subsidy programme a) 0.019*** 0.047*** 0.016*** 0.050*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Notes: a) The prediction of the probability of participating in each programme is obtained from Table 4. Boot-
strapped standard errors between parentheses. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions 
include the same explanatory variables as estimations in Table 4.  
  
As we have explained before, to face this subject we also apply a matching estimator for the 
cases depicted in Table 1. To obtain the propensity scores that allow us to build the counter-
factual, for each treatment a probit model is estimated considering the same explanatory vari-
ables of the multivariate probit presented in Table 4. The detailed explanations of our match-
ing procedure and the tests that we use to evaluate the implementation of the propensity score 
matching can be found in Appendix 3.    
As for the propensity to engage in R&D activities, the results in Table 7 show that getting 
public funding of any type has a positive effect on the decision to undertake R&D activities as 
compared to not obtaining public funding at all (cases A to E). In terms of being supported 
through a unique instrument (cases A, B and C), the largest impact takes place when the firm 
is awarded a UE grant. Specifically, being supported through European subsidies increases 
the likelihood of performing internal R&D activities of non-supported firms by 24.1 percent-
age points. This impact is more than three times larger than the one of loans. Another interest-
ing result is that the impacts of national or European subsidies are greater on the propensity to 
engage in total R&D than on internal R&D, reflecting that these instruments are more effec-
tive to stimulate the performance of external R&D activities. However, the opposite happens 
in the case of CDTI loans. They seem to have a higher effect on the decision to undertake 
internal R&D expenditures.  
It is worth noting that, regarding the propensity to undertake R&D expenditures, no treatment 
effect is computed for cases J and K. In these cases, both the actual status and the counterfac-
tual imply getting a subsidy to finance internal R&D. Therefore, all firms engage in R&D 
activities.  
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There is also a positive effect of all types of support on internal and total R&D. That is, there 
is not full crowding-out of private R&D expenditures. This result is in line with Czarnitzki 
and Lopes-Bento (2014) regarding public subsidies. In addition, when we compare the effects 
of single treatments (cases A to C) with respect to the non-public funding situation, the mag-
nitudes are higher for public subsidies than for CDTI loans.  
The rest of the cases in Table 7 allow us to analyse the differences (if they exist) among the 
effects of the heterogeneous treatments. In particular, the results for case J suggest that there 
is no difference between being supported only through a national subsidy or a European grant. 
This result justifies that we consider getting subsidies as a unique treatment regardless of the 
national or supranational character of the supporting entity (cases D, H, I and K).  
Cases F, G and H compare the impact of subsidies with soft loans. As can be seen, firms that 
are awarded a national and/or a European subsidy would have invested less if they would 
have received a CDTI loan instead of the grant.  
In addition, those companies that receive both subsidies and loans invest more compared to 
the counterfactual situation of getting funding only from the CDTI (case I). However, the op-
posite is not the case: adding soft loans to public subsidies does not imply an increase in 
firms’ gross R&D investment (case K). These two last results would suggest only a partial 
rejection of the hypothesis of crowding-out effect between subsidies and CDTI loans.  
We have also considered the symmetric cases of the combinations analysed in Table 7, inter-
changing actual treatments with the counterfactuals. This allows wondering, for example, 
whether non-supported firms would have benefited if they had received a soft loan, a national 
subsidy or a UE grant, respectively. Our results confirm the direction of the effects. We find 
negative (non-significant) treatments when the symmetric cases show positive (non-
significant) treatments in Table 7.10    
                                                
10 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 7: Matching results: Effect of public support on R&D  
   Dependent variable: 
Case Actual status Counterfactual 
Propensity to 
engage in internal 
R&D (0/1) 
Internal 
R&D intensity 
(log.) 
Propensity to 
engage in total 
R&D (0/1) 
Total R&D 
intensity 
(log.) 
A Only CDTI loan No public funding 0.075*** 0.714*** 0.068*** 0.792*** 
B Only national subsidy No public funding 0.173*** 1.946*** 0.210*** 1.752*** 
C Only European subsidy No public funding 0.241*** 2.248*** 0.262*** 2.107*** 
D Only subsidies No public funding 0.190*** 2.094*** 0.223*** 1.899*** 
E CDTI loans & subsidies No public funding 0.126*** 1.727*** 0.147*** 1.636*** 
F Only national subsidy Only CDTI loan 0.101*** 0.963*** 0.122*** 0.859*** 
G Only European subsidy Only CDTI loan 0.140*** 1.200** 0.161*** 1.054** 
H Only subsidies Only CDTI loan 0.109*** 0.961*** 0.126*** 0.846*** 
I CDTI loans & subsidies Only CDTI loan 0.071*** 1.331*** 0.094*** 1.200*** 
J Only European subsidy Only national subsidy - -0.107 - -0.134 
K CDTI loans & subsidies Only subsidies - 0.172 - 0.189 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors. ***, **, * indicate a 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance level, respectively.  In cases J and K, all firms engage in R&D 
activities.  
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Finally, in Table 8 we present the results of our matching procedure for two sub-samples: 
SMEs (with a number of employees between 10 and 199)11 and large firms (200 or more em-
ployees). In both groups of companies, balancing tests after matching confirm that our match-
ing specification generates well balanced samples (see Appendix 3). 
One of the restrictions in our data that could be hindering the estimation of our equation [1] is 
the absence of control variables reflecting the capital structure of Spanish companies. In this 
line, the different role of firm size as explanatory variable for the participation in public pro-
grammes can also be reflecting a different degree of financial constraints faced by SMEs and 
large firms. At this respect, the role of public support systems tends to be more relevant for 
SMEs for which liquidity constraints should be stronger (Zúñiga et al., 2014). Ali-Yrkkö 
(2005) specifically finds a positive effect of public funding on the R&D of small firms, which 
would be more likely to face financial constraints. Using firm-level data from two waves of 
the Spanish CIS, Busom et al. (2014) also conclude that for SMEs, internal and external fi-
nancing constraints are positively associated with the likelihood of receiving direct funding.12 
However, in the case of large firms only the difficulties in external access to funds are posi-
tively related to the awarding of direct support.  
The results in Table 8 confirm the existence of heterogeneous impacts of public support be-
tween these two groups of companies. For SMEs, estimated treatment effects show similar 
patterns than in the whole sample: all public funding programmes display a relevant effect on 
the decision to undertake R&D activities and strongly stimulate internal and total R&D inten-
sity. The five statuses of public support considered in cases A to E have a positive and signifi-
cant effect compared with the counterfactual of not obtaining public funding at all. Again, 
there is not a significant treatment in case J, where we analyse whether firms supported 
through a national subsidy have a different intensity respect to firms granted with a European 
subsidy.  
                                                
11 This is a usual criterion in Spanish statistics because Spanish firm size is smaller than the European average 
(European Commission, 2003). In particular, in the Spanish Innovation Survey, the population of companies is 
stratified considering the following brackets, based on the number of employees: 10 to 49, 50 to 199, 200 and 
over. The strata made up of companies with 200 or more employees are analysed exhaustively. 
12 In their analysis, they cannot distinguish between grants and loans. Both are considered as a unique instrument 
that is compared with R&D tax incentives.  
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Table 8: Matching results: Effect of public support on R&D. Large firms vs SMEs 
    Dependent variable: 
 
Case Actual status Counterfactual 
Propensity to 
engage in internal 
R&D (0/1) 
Internal 
R&D intensity 
(log.) 
Propensity to 
engage in total 
R&D (0/1) 
Total R&D 
intensity 
(log.) 
Large firms 
A Only CDTI loan No public funding 0.049 0.503*** 0.071*** 0.606*** 
B Only national subsidy No public funding 0.096*** 0.629*** 0.079*** 0.545*** 
C Only European subsidy No public funding 0.122* 0.712 0.098* 0.548 
D Only subsidies No public funding 0.109*** 0.962*** 0.091*** 0.840*** 
E CDTI loans & subsidies No public funding 0.150*** 1.320*** 0.135*** 1.428*** 
F Only national subsidy Only CDTI loan 0.065 0.553 0.032 0.445 
G Only European subsidy Only CDTI loan 0.167 1.002 0.125 0.783 
H Only subsidies Only CDTI loan 0.093** 0.758** 0.056* 0.579* 
I CDTI loans & subsidies Only CDTI loan 0.052 0.493 0.026 0.442* 
J Only European subsidy Only national subsidy - 0.137 - 0.040 
K CDTI loans & subsidies Only subsidies - 0.065 - 0.100 
SMEs 
A Only CDTI loan No public funding 0.107*** 1.237*** 0.107*** 1.270*** 
B Only national subsidy No public funding 0.263*** 2.528*** 0.239*** 2.448*** 
C Only European subsidy No public funding 0.299*** 2.842*** 0.253*** 2.524*** 
D Only subsidies No public funding 0.267*** 2.580*** 0.238*** 2.427*** 
E CDTI loans & subsidies No public funding 0.178*** 2.247*** 0.147*** 2.082*** 
F Only national subsidy Only CDTI loan 0.146*** 1.166*** 0.114*** 0.971*** 
G Only European subsidy Only CDTI loan 0.164*** 1.397*** 0.134*** 1.085* 
H Only subsidies Only CDTI loan 0.143*** 1.272*** 0.110*** 1.088*** 
I CDTI loans & subsidies Only CDTI loan 0.071*** 1.232*** 0.078** 1.115*** 
J Only European subsidy Only national subsidy - 0.132 - 0.030 
K CDTI loans & subsidies Only subsidies - 0.415*** - 0.443*** 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors. ***, **, * indicate a 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance level, respectively.  In cases J and K, all firms engage in R&D 
activities.  
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In addition, the hypothesis of crowding-out effect between subsides and loans is rejected both 
in cases H and K: Firms who receive subsidies and loans invest more in R&D activities com-
pared to the counterfactual situation of getting funding only through a loan or only through a 
subsidies. That is, for SMEs, there is a complementarity among the different schemes of pub-
lic funding: adding together multiple aids results in higher resources for R&D&I activities.    
However, the effects of public support are much smaller in the case of large firms. In addition, 
recipients of a national or a European subsidy would have invested similarly if they had bene-
fited from a CDTI loan (cases F and G). Accordingly, we cannot find clear evidence of com-
plementarity among subsidies and CDTI loans (cases I and K).  
These findings suggest that, regardless of the firm size, subsidy programmes are more effec-
tive than low-interest loans to foster R&D activities of Spanish companies. For SMEs, which 
are more subject to internal financial constraints, multiple programme participation has a 
higher effect than a single scheme use. However, in case of large firms we cannot reject the 
hypothesis of crowding-out effect between subsidies and CDTI loans.       
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical evidence on the impact of public aid on private R&D has substantially increased 
during the last decades, with a multiplicity of methodologies used to control for potential en-
dogeneity of public support. However, most papers examine only the impact of one support 
programme and this fact prevents the comparison of the effects among different policy in-
struments. 
The objective of our study is to contribute to this debate by examining the effect of participat-
ing within three types of instruments used by public administrations to support Spanish firms: 
the programme of low-interest loans provided by the CDTI, the main national agency which 
finances firms’ R&D projects; the national scheme of R&D subsidies; and the European sys-
tem of R&D grants.  This will allow us to analyse the relative relevance of two features of 
public programmes: the national or supranational character of the financing agency and the 
magnitude of reimbursement implied in the design of public support. To our knowledge, no 
previous empirical research exists comparing the effects of public subsidies and loans on pri-
vate R&D. 
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To face the typical selectivity and endogeneity problems that are present in this kind of analy-
sis, we follow two alternative methodologies. Initially, we use a Heckman’s treatment effect 
model, which consists of two stages. In the first stage, we estimate a multivariate probit model 
to study the determinants of participation in each of the three public programmes. Afterwards, 
in a second stage, we analyse how this participation affects the R&D intensity of the firms. 
We complement this treatment analysis employing an econometric matching procedure. This 
procedure allows us to test whether there is substitutability or complementarity among the 
different public funding policies.   
The results obtained for a sample of 4,407 Spanish firms during the period 2002-2005 can be 
summarised as follows: 
Firstly, participation in national subsidy programmes and participation in European subsidy 
programmes are positively linked to each other. The same happens with CDTI soft loans and 
national subsidies schemes, indicating the presence of common unobserved factors that affect 
the probability of participating in both programmes. In addition, we find that the participants 
within the three systems of public aid have different features, suggesting that the programmes 
do not completely overlap in terms of their recipients. 
Secondly, regardless of the methodology employed for the analysis, being awarded public aid 
clearly increases the probability of conducting R&D activities. In terms of being supported 
through a unique instrument, the greatest effect corresponds to the case of European grants, 
where the impact is more than three times larger than the one of loans. In order to stimulate 
firms to engage in R&D activities, this suggests that it may be better to support them through 
subsidies than through low-interest loans. As for the intensive margin, the hypothesis of full 
crowding-out of private R&D is rejected for all types of support.  
Thirdly, we find different impacts when we distinguish between SMEs and large firms. For 
the first, which are more subject to financial constraints, estimated average treatment effects 
are in general higher. In addition, both in terms of extensive and intensive margins, multiple 
programme participation has a higher effect than a single scheme use. However, we cannot 
rule out the existence of crowding-out effect between subsidies and CDTI loans in the case of 
large firms. Therefore, the effectiveness of innovation policy differs depending on firm size. 
Any type of direct support has a higher impact on the propensity to perform R&D activities of 
SMEs. In addition, for large firms, that are supposed to be less financially restricted, public 
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agencies should be conscious that multiple programme participation could not cause an in-
crease of recipients’ R&D investment as compared to a situation of single programme partici-
pation.  
An aspect that remains to be studied is whether our conclusions remain with regard to firms’ 
technological outputs as process and product innovations, or patents. For this task, it would be 
necessary to have information on the amount of funding awarded to each firm through each 
public programme. This information would also allow for testing not only full but partial 
crowding out of public funding.  
Furthermore, it could be crucial to study the role of repeated support. Previous research 
stresses that firms with past experience in a support programme have a higher probability of 
participating again because they learn from previous participation which reduces their costs 
for re-applying (Hernán et al., 2003; Barajas and Huergo, 2010). At the same time, public 
support can have a certifying effect on innovative companies, helping these firms to obtain 
private external financing in future periods and, therefore, making public aid less necessary. 
Note also that, since the matching procedure models selection only on observed characteris-
tics, the availability of information about previous participation in public support programmes 
would ensure the reliability of the results.   
Finally, our analysis is limited to the effect of public direct support on business R&D for the 
specific case of Spanish firms. It would be also relevant to extend the analysis to other coun-
tries to check the generalization of our results.  
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Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
All variables but CDTI loan were provided by the Spanish Institute of Statistics from the 
Technological Innovation Survey. The information about loans comes from the CDTI data-
base. See the unit of measurement of each variable in Table A.2 of Appendix 2.  
Belonging to a group: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to a 
group. 
CDTI loan: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has been awarded a CDTI 
soft loan during the year. 
European subsidy: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has been awarded a 
European subsidy during the year. 
Exporter: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company exported during the peri-
od. 
Foreign capital: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the firm is partly owned by a 
foreign firm (more than 50% of foreign capital during the period). 
High and medium-tech manufacturing: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the 
company belongs to any high or medium-tech manufacturing sectors (NACE2 codes 24, 29, 
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35). 
High and medium-tech services: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company 
belongs to high-tech services (NACE2 codes 64, 72, 73, 92) 
Internal R&D intensity: Ratio of internal expenditures on R&D over total employment. 
National subsidy: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has been awarded a 
national subsidy during the year. 
Public firm: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the firm is partly publicly owned 
(more than 50% of public capital during the period). 
R&D performer: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has positive expendi-
tures on R&D during the year. 
Relative labour productivity: Ratio of firm labour productivity (sales over employment) 
over the industry average at NACE 2-digit level.   
Size: number of employees during the current year. 
Start-up: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm was created during the last 
three years. 
Technological cooperation: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company estab-
lished technological cooperation agreements during the last three years with other partners. 
Total R&D intensity: Ratio of total expenditures on R&D (including technology imports) 
over total employment. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table A.1: Matching possibilities  
 
 
Dependent variable:  
Actual status 
Counterfactual 
N. of 
Obser. 
No public 
funding 
Only 
CDTI 
loan 
Only 
national 
subsidy 
Only  
European 
subsidy 
CDTI loan &
national  
subsidy 
CDTI loan & 
European 
subsidy 
National &
European 
subsidies 
All types 
of public 
funding 
No public funding 9.662  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 
Only CDTI loan 1.108 Case 29  Case 8 Case 9  Case 10 Case 11 Case 12  Case 13 
Only national subsidy 1.451 Case 30 Case 31  Case 14  Case 15  Case 16  Case 17 Case 18 
Only European subsidy 322 Case 32 Case 33 Case 34  Case 19 Case 20 Case 21 Case 22 
CDTI loan & national subsidy 587 Case 35 Case 36 Case 37 Case 38  Case 23 Case 24 Case 25 
CDTI loan & European subsidy 32 Case 39 Case 40 Case 41 Case 42 Case 43  Case 26 Case 27 
National & European subsidies 324 Case 44 Case 45 Case 46 Case 47 Case 48 Case 49  Case 28 
All types of public funding 60 Case 50 Case 51 Case 52 Case 53 Case 54 Case 55 Case 56  
Total 13.546         
Note: Cases in bold could not be estimated due to data limitations.
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Table A.2: Statistics of main variables 
 
 Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
R&D funding (1/0)      
Own funding  0.563 0.496 0 1 1 
CDTI loan 0.132 0.238 0 1 0 
National subsidy 0.177 0.381 0 1 0 
European subsidy  0.054 0.227 0 1 0 
Other firm characteristics (1/0)      
Belonging to a group 0.399 0.490 0 1 0 
Exporter 0.548 0.498 0 1 1 
Foreign capital  0.115 0.319 0 1 0 
High and medium-tech manufacturing 0.235 0.424 0 1 0 
High and medium-tech services 0.096 0.295 0 1 0 
Internal R&D performer   0.592 0.491 0 1 1 
Public firm 0.020 0.139 0 1 0 
R&D performer (internal and external) 0.625 0.484 0 1 1 
Start-up 0.032 0.172 0 1 0 
Technological cooperation with: 0.340 0.474 0 1 0 
   - clients    0.088 0.283 0 1 0 
   - competitors 0.062 0.242 0 1 0 
   - consultants & laboratories 0.081 0.273 0 1 0 
   - PRCs 0.081 0.273 0 1 0 
   - other firms of the group  0.078 0.269 0 1 0 
   - providers  0.126 0.332 0 1 0 
   - technological centres 0.128 0.334 0 1 0 
   - universities 0.168 0.374 0 1 0 
Other firm characteristics (quantitative):      
Export intensity (Export over sales) 0.171   0.263 0 1 0.011 
External R&D Expenditures (K€) 235.7 2,239.1 0 54,800 0 
Internal R&D Expenditures (K€) 719.5 3,910.4  0 72,300 53.6 
Percentage of R&D employees (%) 43.1 42.0 0 100 38.3 
R&D intensity (K€ per employee) 7.0   27.8 0 1,268.4 0.8 
Relative labour productivity 1.0 2.9 0 178.0 0.7 
Size (Number of employees)  358.2 1,096.8 1 13,023 69 
Total R&D intensity (K€ per employee) 8.7   34.9 0 1,441.2 1.1 
Number of observations (firms) 13,546 (4,407)  
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Table A.3: Industries in the estimation sample 
  Number of observations 
 
Industries NACE2 codes Total 
No public 
funding 
Only 
CDTI 
loan 
Only    
national 
subsidy 
Only      
European 
subsidy 
CDTI loan 
& national 
subsidy 
CDTI loan & 
European 
subsidy 
National & 
European 
subsidies 
All types 
of public 
funding 
1. Agriculture 1-5 20 12 3 3 1 0 1 0 0 
2. Extractive industry and Energy 10-14, 23, 40-41 130 90 5 10 11 1 0 11 2 
3. Low-tech manufacturing 15-22, 25-28, 36, 
37 
2789 2121 241 234 27 126 9 23 8 
4. High & medium-tech manufacturing 24, 29-35 2144 1280 291 286 34 174 5 58 16 
5. Construction 45 37 22 6 3 2 0 0 2 2 
6. Retail and whole sale trade, sale, 
maintenance and repair of vehicles 
50-52 773 712 17 35 3 5 0 1 0 
7. Transport service 60-63               228 213 3 6 6 0 0 0 0 
8. Financial intermediation and real 
estate activities 
65-67, 70 214 204 1 4 4 0 1 0 0 
9. Other low-tech services 55, 71, 74-75, 80, 
85, 90-91, 93 
1556 1260 29 160 30 22 4 42 9 
10. High & medium-tech services 64, 72-73, 92 825 474 40 157 29 34 3 84 4 
Total  8,716 6,388 636 898 147 362 23 221 41 
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Table A.4: Transition rates across participation status 
  Status in t  
Status in t-1 
Number of 
observations 
No 
public 
funding 
Only 
CDTI 
loan 
Only 
national 
subsidy 
Only  
European 
subsidy 
CDTI 
loan & 
national 
subsidy 
CDTI 
loan & 
European 
subsidy 
National 
& 
European 
subsidies 
All types 
of public 
funding 
 
No public funding 6,124 84.7 6.7 5.0 0.7 2.1 0.2 0.6 0.1 100 
Only CDTI loan 677 65.7 12.4 15.1 1.0 4.7 0.0 1.0 0.0 100 
Only national subsidy 1,009 45.3 9.2 28.1 1.4 12.7 0.3 2.9 0.2 100 
Only European subsidy 233 54.1 3.4 7.3 21.0 2.2 2.6 8.2 1.3 100 
CDTI loan & national subsidy 403 34.2 8.7 38.0 0.7 14.1 0.5 2.2 1.5 100 
CDTI loan & European subsidy 21 33.3 4.8 4.8 14.3 9.5 0.0 19.1 14.3 100 
National & European subsidies 218 13.8 3.2 15.6 10.6 4.6 0.9 47.7 3.7 100 
All types of public funding 48 10.4 4.2 14.6 8.3 2.1 2.1 31.3 27.1 100 
Total 8,733 73.2 7.3 10.4 1.7 4.2 0.3 2.5 0.5 100 
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Table A.5: Pairwise correlation matrix  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
[1] Patent application 1 
[2] Percentage of R&D employees 0.308* 1 
[3] TC with clients 0.118* 0.153* 1 
[4] TC with competitors 0.136* 0.176* 0.305* 1 
[5] TC with other firms from the group 0.136* 0.197* 0.276* 0.339* 1 
[6] TC with providers 0.082* 0.162* 0.200* 0.238* 0.314* 1 
[7] TC with consultants & laboratories 0.110* 0.143* 0.244* 0.338* 0.281* 0.231* 1 
[8] TC with universities, PRCs and technological centres 0.219* 0.330* 0.258* 0.350* 0.336* 0.276* 0.331* 1 
[9] Belonging to a group 0.058* 0.049* 0.304* 0.090* 0.049* 0.043* 0.078* 0.054* 1 
[10] Exporter 0.190* 0.269* 0.082* 0.089* 0.088* 0.055* 0.060* 0.165* 0.092* 1 
[11] Foreign capital 0.029* 0.024 0.120* 0.019 0.032* 0.020 0.007 0.001 0.375* 0.124* 1 
[12] Public firm -0.039* -0.043* -0.009 0.019 -0.019 0.013 -0.012 -0.005 -0.033* -0.117* -0.055* 1 
[13] Size 0.018 -0.048* 0.180* 0.105* 0.021 0.043* 0.072* -0.004 0.446* 0.059* 0.270* 0.122* 1 
[14] Start-up 0.058* 0.098* 0.009 0.015 0.047* 0.026 0.005 0.052* -0.025 -0.041* -0.038* -0.016 -0.129* 1 
Notes: TC stands for technological cooperation. *correlation coefficient significant at the 5% level. 
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Appendix 3: Description of the matching procedure 
In this appendix, we describe the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique that we use to 
construct a sample of firms with characteristics similar to each treated group in Tables 7 and 
8. To compute the propensity score for our matching routine, for each treatment we use the 
same specification of the multivariate probit of equation [1]. We choose the caliper matching 
algorithm with replacing, in which treated companies are matched with the non-treated ones 
(control group) that are closest in terms of the propensity score subject to the constraint that 
there has to be at most a maximum distance of 0.05 between the treated and non-treated firm. 
The procedure is performed in Stata 13, using the psmatch2 routine implemented by Leuven 
and Sianesi (2003). 
To tests the matching quality we check whether the distribution of covariates is balanced in 
the treated and control groups (Tables A.6 and A.7). Specifically, we analyse if all variables 
have the same mean in the two groups and we also report whether, after matching, the covari-
ates no longer explain the probability of participation well. In all cases presented in Tables 7 
and 8, our matching procedure has been able to balance the treated and non-treated groups, 
creating a homogenous group with common characteristics before participation in each public 
funding programme.  
Specifically, Tables A.6 and A.7 show the balancing tests after matching, respectively for the 
entire sample and distinguishing between SMEs and large firms. As you can see in the last 
column of both tables, in none of the cases the LR-Chi2 statistic exceeds the critical value at 
the 5 per cent significance level. In addition, the Pseudo-R2 after matching is close to zero in 
most cases. Therefore, after matching the covariates do not seem to have any explanatory 
power to predict the participation into the funding programme. In this sense, it seems that our 
matching specification generates well balanced samples. 
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Table A.6: Balancing tests after matching. All firms 
Case Actual status Counterfactual Ps R2 LR Chi2(19) p>Chi2 
A Only CDTI loan No public funding 0.007 12.42 0.867 
B Only national subsidy No public funding 0.009 21.32 0.319 
C Only European subsidy No public funding 0.041 16.54 0.621 
D Only subsidies No public funding 0.005 17.76 0.539 
E CDTI loans & subsidies No public funding 0.015 17.42 0.561 
F Only national subsidy Only CDTI loan 0.006 11.35 0.991 
G Only European subsidy Only CDTI loan 0.052 17.72 0.541 
H Only subsidies Only CDTI loan 0.007 11.72 0.897 
I CDTI loans & subsidies Only CDTI loan 0.010 11.77 0.895 
J Only European subsidy Only national subsidy 0.030 12.19 0.875 
K CDTI loans & subsidies Only subsidies 0.016 18.60 0.483 
 
Notes: LR Chi2 reports the test on overall significance of the probit model after the matching.  
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Table A.7: Balancing tests after matching. Large firms vs SMEs   
    Number of observations    
 
Case Actual status Counterfactual Total 
Treated 
group 
Control 
group Ps R2 LR Chi2(N) p>Chi2 
Large firms 
A Only CDTI loan No public funding 356 185 171 0.011 6.31 0.991 
B Only national subsidy No public funding 343 178 165 0.009 5.24 0.997 
C Only European subsidy No public funding 87 44 43 0.033 4.42 0.999 
D Only subsidies No public funding 456 230 226 0.014 14.37 0.641 
E CDTI loans & subsidies No public funding 248 127 121 0.014 6.20 0.992 
F Only national subsidy Only CDTI loan 185 95 90 0.031 17.61 0.414 
G Only European subsidy Only CDTI loan 53 26 27 0.186 19.04 0.326 
H Only subsidies Only CDTI loan 217 109 108 0.020 10.66 0.874 
I CDTI loans & subsidies Only CDTI loan 161 80 81 0.047 19.88 0.281 
J Only European subsidy Only national subsidy 63 32 31 0.189 24.60 0.104 
K CDTI loans & subsidies Only subsidies 222 117 105 0.021 9.40 0.927 
SMEs 
A Only CDTI loan No public funding 756 384 372 0.011 13.36 0.770 
B Only national subsidy No public funding 1054 536 518 0.007 12.78 0.804 
C Only European subsidy No public funding 173 89 84 0.056 14.78 0.677 
D Only subsidies No public funding 1194 607 587 0.006 15.51 0.627 
E CDTI loans & subsidies No public funding 459 233 226 0.027 19.81 0.343 
F Only national subsidy Only CDTI loan 439 221 218 0.018 21.44 0.258 
G Only European subsidy Only CDTI loan 137 69 68 0.069 16.77 0.539 
H Only subsidies Only CDTI loan 499 245 254 0.010 11.77 0.860 
I CDTI loans & subsidies Only CDTI loan 338 168 170 0.007 4.99 0.998 
J Only European subsidy Only national subsidy 171 87 84 0.037 9.65 0.918 
K CDTI loans & subsidies Only subsidies 404 206 198 0.014 10.24 0.924 
Notes: LR Chi2(N) reports the test on overall significance of the Probit model after the matching (N is 17 for large firms and 18 for SMEs)   
 
